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Statistics, Not Memories: What
Was the Standard of Care for
Administering Antenatal
Steroids to Women in Preterm
Labor Between 1985 and 2000?
William L. Meadow, MD, PhD,
Anthony Bell, MD, and Cass R. Sunstein, JD
Department of Pediatrics and Law School, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois
We determined the frequency of antenatal corticosteroid use
for mothers with threatened premature delivery in 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000. We next compared published data to
the surveyed recollections of 302 obstetricians who were prac-
ticing during these years. Two points emerged. First, pub-
lished reports reveal that the use of antenatal corticosteroids
increased steadily, from 8% in 1985 to 20% in 1990, 52% in
1995, and 75% in 2000 (P < .001). Second, “expert” opinions
derived from the recollections of practicing obstetricians con-
sistently overestimated the actual use of antenatal corticoste-
roids during the year in question—31% versus 8% for 1985,
56% versus 20% for 1990, 78% versus 52% for 1995, and 92%
versus 72% for 2000 (all Ps < .001). The use of antenatal
corticosteroids by obstetricians in the past 15 years reveals a
phenomenon that is widely recognized elsewhere—retrospec-
tive memories are often wrong, and when they are wrong
they are not randomly wrong. Rather, recollections are sys-
tematically skewed toward an outcome that, in hindsight, is
considered desirable (the “Monday morning quarterback”
phenomenon). We offer a simple proposal. In determining
the“standardofmedicalcare,”thelegalsystemshouldrelyon
statistical data about doctors’ performance rather than the
recollections of experts about doctors’ performance. The falli-
ble memories of isolated experts are a crude second-best, far
inferiortothedatathattheyapproximate.Widespreadadop-
tion of this view by professional physician organizations
would dramatically increase the rationality of expert testi-
mony in medical malpractice tort law. (Obstet Gynecol
2003;102:356–62. © 2003 by The American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists.)
Imagine this: In the early 1990s, a woman was admitted
to an obstetric service in the early stages of labor at 28
weeks’ gestation. At the time of admission, her fetus was
estimated to weigh 0.9 kg (2 lb). The likelihood of
survival for an infant born at that gestation in the early
1990s was approximately 80%. However, the likelihood
that the infant would exhibit respiratory distress syn-
drome (RDS) of prematurity after birth was also approx-
imately 80%. There had been reports in the medical
literature for more than a decade that administration of
antenatal corticosteroids might reduce the incidence and
severity of RDS in infants after birth. However, the
indications and side effects of administering antenatal
corticosteroids to mothers were not well understood.
Some obstetricians used antenatal corticosteroids rou-
tinely in the early 1990s. Most did not. This woman’s
obstetrician did not.
The woman delivered the infant at 28 weeks’ gesta-
tion, and it weighed 0.9 kg (2 lb). The infant was sick
with RDS but did not die. It suffered long-term perma-
nent morbidity related to the RDS. The obstetrician was
sued for malpractice—speciﬁcally, for failing to adminis-
ter antenatal corticosteroids to the mother before deliv-
ery.
At trial, the plaintiff’s expert claimed that in the early
1990s it was the “standard of care” to administer antena-
tal corticosteroids, and that a failure to have adminis-
tered them to this mother constituted medical negli-
gence. This claim was based on the expert’s experience
and training in the ﬁeld. A defense expert argued that
only a minority of obstetricians were using antenatal
corticosteroids in the early 1990s, and consequently the
standard of care, which he took to be the use of “ordi-
nary care in similar circumstances,” did not require
antenatal corticosteroids in this case. The defense expert
buttressed his opinion by pointing to a large body of
medical literature. Published articles described the expe-
rience of more than 30,000 women in the early 1990s
who delivered comparably premature infants. The over-
all percentage receiving antenatal corticosteroids was
20%.
How should a juror decide which of these arguments
is more persuasive? More precisely, how much weight
should be given to statistical descriptions of medical
practice versus anecdotal recollection of an expert’s indi-
vidual experience?
In most jurisdictions in the United States, jurors are
instructed that a doctor must “use the skill and care that
is ordinarily used by reasonably well-qualiﬁed doctors in
similar cases....Afailure to do so is a form of negli-
gence called malpractice.”
1,2 Moreover, except in unusu-
ally obvious circumstances (such as operating on the
Address reprint requests to: William L. Meadow, MD, PhD, Depart-
ment of Pediatrics, MC 6060, University of Chicago Children’s Hos-
pital, 5825 South Maryland Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637; E-mail:
wlm1@midway.uchicago.edu.
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what level of care physicians ordinarily provide and
consequently are informed by the testimony of medical
expert witnesses. Expert witnesses, in turn, are expected
to describe the relevant standards of medical care by
reﬂecting on their own professional experience.
2
A problem immediately arises, although it is not usu-
ally recognized as such. No additional instructions are
offered regarding the mechanism by which the expert is
supposed to convert experience, knowledge, and train-
ing into an opinion. One might assume that the expert is
being asked to recall what he or she and his or her
reasonably well-qualiﬁed colleagues usually did in simi-
lar circumstances and testify accordingly. This seems
obvious. However, there is much more to say. To begin
with, a great deal of literature over several decades in
many related areas of memory research suggests that
anecdotal recollection of past experience is ﬂawed.
3,4
Moreover, anecdotal recall is not randomly wrong—
rather, it tends to be skewed in the direction that in
hindsight would have been preferred. That is, once an
outcome is known to have occurred, the predominant
reaction is “I knew it all along.” This is often called the
“Monday morning quarterback” phenomenon.
5,6
Experts are not immune to such memory ﬂaws. Even
professional golfers misremember. In an extensive sur-
vey, golfers on average claimed that the percentage of
6-foot putts they made was 75%, but actual observation
put the number signiﬁcantly lower, at 55%.
7 As another
example, when emergency room physicians were asked
how long it took them to diagnose and begin antibiotic
treatment for children with suspected meningitis, they
recalled 46 minutes. Actual observation found the num-
ber to be signiﬁcantly longer, at 120 minutes.
8
These examples are not elicited to demonstrate that
professional golfers or emergency room physicians are
deliberately untruthful. Rather, selective skewed recall
appears to be part of us all. We would all rewrite parts of
history if we could, and in our minds, we cannot help
doing it.
We have explored the Monday morning quarterback
phenomenon in the context of administration of antena-
tal corticosteroids to women in preterm labor in the
United States over the past 15 years. To do so, we ﬁrst
determined the actual use of antenatal corticosteroids at
5-year intervals between 1985 and 2000, as documented
in reports from tens of thousands of patients in the
medical literature. We then sampled the recollections of
several hundred potential “expert witnesses”: obstetri-
cians who had been in clinical practice during the period
in question. We compared the published data to the
recollections of the obstetric specialists.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Published Data on Antenatal Corticosteroid Use From
1985 Through 2000
To estimate the actual frequency of antenatal corticoste-
roid use, we searched MEDLINE and PubMed for the
MeSH key word “antenatal corticosteroids.” We then
found and read each article that pertained to the inci-
dence of antenatal corticosteroid use in human infants in
1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 (Wright LL, Fanaroff AA,
Poole WK, Carlo W, Vohr BR, Ehrenksang RA, Scott
BJ, McDonald SA. Repeat courses of antenatal steroids:
Risks and beneﬁts [abstract]. Pediatr Res 2001;49:287A)
(Narendran V, Donovan EF, Hoath SB, Warner BB,
Steichen JJ, Jobe AH. Comparison between early bubble
CPAP and conventional CPAP in reducing the inci-
dence of chronic lung disease [abstract]. Pediatr Res
2002;51:337A).
9–24 In addition, a National Institutes of
Health (NIH) conference on the use of antenatal cortico-
steroids convened in 1994 produced many articles that
dealtdirectlyandindirectlywithantenatalcorticosteroid
use and contained numerous references to earlier stud-
ies. After 1994, several publications directly assessed the
impactoftheNIHconsensusstatementonincreasingthe
use of antenatal corticosteroids. Finally, to assess recent
antenatal corticosteroid use (around the year 2000) we
could not rely on published literature, as much remains
in press or under review. Consequently, we reviewed
abstracts from pediatric academic societies and the Soci-
ety of Maternal/Fetal Medicine.
We restricted our database to mothers for whom
antenatal corticosteroids might appropriately have been
prescribed. Consequently, we reviewed publications
with one of two possible inclusion criteria: 1) prematu-
rity or low birth weight—typically, very low birth weight
(VLBW) infants (birth weight less than 1500 g)—where
data were reported from population-based neonatal in-
tensive care unit outcome studies, or 2) RDS—typically,
mechanically ventilated infants—where data were de-
rived from studies of the efﬁcacy of surfactant adminis-
tration.
“Expert Opinions” About Antenatal Corticosteroid Use
From 1985 Through 2000
We had no way of determining which obstetricians had
ever served as expert witnesses, nor were we interested
in sampling just that subset. Rather, we were interested
in demonstrating the phenomenon of hindsight bias for
the ﬁeld as a whole. Consequently, we obtained a list of
allregisteredobstetriciansintheUnitedStatesfromRoss
Laboratories. The obstetricians were identiﬁed by city
and state. We sent out two mailings of 500 surveys each
to ten randomly selected obstetricians in each of the 50
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and 149 responses from the second survey.
The survey questionnaire described a hypothetic case
of a woman presenting in early labor at approximately
28 weeks’ gestation. The obstetricians were asked two
questions regarding the use of antenatal corticosteroids
for this woman:
1) What percentage of obstetricians do you think were
using antenatal corticosteroids in such cases in 1985,
1990, 1995, and 2000?
2) Was it your personal practice to administer antenatal
corticosteroids in such cases in 1985, 1990, 1995, and
2000?
Statistical Analyses
Two separate mailings were sent to obstetricians be-
tween July 2000 and June 2001. Responses regarding
antenatal corticosteroid use from the ﬁrst mailing were
comparedwiththosefromthesecondmailingusingboth
two-way analysis of variance, with year as the within-
group variable and mailing as the across-group variable,
and comparison of proportions test, with correction for
multiple comparisons. No signiﬁcant differences were
found comparing results from the ﬁrst and second mail-
ings. Consequently, data from the two mailings were
combined.
Responses from the obstetricians regarding antenatal
corticosteroids were then contrasted with data derived
from the medical literature using two-way analysis of
variance, z scores derived from the comparison of pro-
portions test, and 
2 analysis.
25 Meta-analysis of the
multiple published descriptions of antenatal corticoste-
roid use during each period was performed using the
numberofpatientsinvolved,notthenumberofhospitals
or publications. For all tests, an  level of P  .01 was
required to assume statistical signiﬁcance.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows antenatal corticosteroid use in 1985,
1990,1995,and2000,asdeterminedfromcasereportsof
92,169 infants in the medical literature. Figure 1 con-
trasts the use of antenatal corticosteroids as reported in
the medical literature with the compiled recollections of
302 “expert” obstetrician respondents to our question-
naire. Two points are readily apparent. First, published
reports revealed that the use of antenatal corticosteroids
increased steadily, from 8% in 1985 to 20% in 1990, 52%
in 1995, and 75% in 2000 (P  .001). Second, expert
opinions derived from the recollections of practicing
obstetricians consistently overestimated the actual use of
antenatal corticosteroids during every year in question:
31% versus 8% for 1985, 56% versus 20% for 1990, 78%
versus 52% for 1995, and 92% versus 72% for 2000 (all
Ps  .001).
In addition to consistently overestimating their col-
leagues’ use of antenatal corticosteroids from 1985 to
2000, the obstetrician respondents consistently ranked
their personal use higher than their estimates of the
average behavior at the time: 68% versus 31% in 1985,
Table 1. Publications Used to Document Antenatal Corticosteroid Use, 1985–2000
Documented year No. of infants % ACS Inclusion criteria Reference
1983–1985 3780 8.1 BW, RDS 14
1985 970 10 BW 13
1989–1990 1533 34 BW, RDS 14–16
1988–1992 9949 19.2 BW 17
1989–1990 3270 25.4 BW, RDS 14
1989–1990 11,077 13.9 RDS 12
1989–1991 915 19.7 BW, RDS 14
1990–1991 6425 22.4 BW 18–20
1989–1990 480 20 BW 13
1990–1991 356 27 BW 21
1994 3239 33 BW, RDS 22
1994–1995 279 46 BW 17
1994–1995 19,252 53.8 BW 24
1995 191 63 RDS 23
1999 26,007 72 BW 24
1998–2000 4047 74 BW Wright*
1999–2001 399 78 RDS Narendran
†
ACS  antenatal corticosteroid; BW  birth weight 500–1500 g; RDS  respiratory distress syndrome requiring mechanical ventilation.
A total of 92,169 infants were represented in these publications.
* Wright LL, Fanaroff AA, Poole WK, et al. Repeat courses of antenatal steroids: Risks and beneﬁts [abstract]. Pediatr Res 2001;49:287A.
† Narendran V, Donovan EF, Hoath SB, Warner BB, Steichen JJ, Jobe AH. Comparison between early bubble CPAP and conventional CPAP
in reducing the incidence of chronic lung disease [abstract]. Pediatr Res 2002;51:337A.
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100% versus 92% in 2000 (all Ps  .01).
DISCUSSION
We demonstrate a phenomenon that is widely recog-
nized elsewhere: Retrospective memories are often
wrong, and when they are wrong they are not randomly
wrong. Rather, recollections are systematically skewed
toward an outcome that, in hindsight, is considered
desirable.
Over the past 15 years it has become widely accepted
that antenatal corticosteroid administration to women in
preterm labor signiﬁcantly reduces complications in pre-
maturely delivered infants.
9–12 Antenatal corticosteroid
use has risen roughly ten-fold, from 8% to 75% for
prematurely delivered infants during this period. Conse-
quently, viewed retrospectively from the vantage point
of 2001, antenatal corticosteroid use for women in pre-
term labor at 28 weeks’ gestation has always been desir-
able. As we hypothesized, the recollections of 302 obste-
tricians surveyed in 2001 about the use of antenatal
corticosteroids for preterm labor in the past 15 years
were wrong and predictably skewed. Obstetricians re-
called antenatal corticosteroid use to have been greater
thanitdemonstrablywasateach5-yearintervalbetween
1985 and 2000.
To the extent that obstetricians like the ones in our
survey might serve as expert witnesses in antenatal cor-
ticosteroidcases,testifyingaboutordinarycareinsimilar
circumstances based upon their recollection of their own
personal experience, they are likely to be wrong. What
do such discrepancies between recollections of expert
practitioners and objective documentation of medical
practice imply for expert testimony in cases of alleged
medical negligence?
Personal Knowledge and Statistical Knowledge
A substantial body of evidence on the psychology of deci-
sion making documents systematic biases in the anecdotal
recallofexperience.Peopleareexcessivelyoptimisticabout
what can happen or has happened; at the same time, they
are overconﬁdent about the accuracy of their memo-
ries.
26–28 Medical experts are not immune from this phe-
nomenon.
3,8,29–31 Moreover, and perhaps most impor-
tantlyfromthestandpointofmalpracticetestimony,people
reliably suffer from hindsight bias. Once an outcome is
known to have occurred, the predominant reaction is “I
knew it all along.”
3,5,29–31 Excessive optimism and skewed
recall about past practices appear to be human nature. This
point raises some serious problems for adjudication of
negligence allegations.
Acentralpurposeofmedicalmalpracticelawistoprotect
the general public by ensuring that physicians provide
reasonable care. Reasonable care is determined, at least in
part, by asking about ordinary practice. If descriptions of
ordinary practice are important to the judicial process, why
should jurors and judges rely on the fallible and anecdote-
driven recollection of an individual expert’s experience,
especially if we know that this recollection is likely to be
wrong? Instead, why not inform jurors and judges of the
veriﬁed and reveriﬁable collective experience of dozens,
hundreds, or even thousands of cases reported by compa-
rably expert physicians? Citations of practice distributions
derived from published medical literature could provide a
necessary buffer for jurors speciﬁcally and the public more
generallyagainsttheinevitablepossibilitythatanindividual
expert’s memory is faulty.
Methodological Concerns With Reliance on Databases
Several methodological concerns must be addressed di-
rectly. Most reﬂect difﬁculties traditionally associated
Figure 1. The use of antenatal corticosteroids (derived from
cases reported in the medical literature) compared with
expert opinions about the use of antenatal corticosteroids
(derived from responses to our survey questionnaire) at
5-year intervals between 1985 and 2000. For 1985, 4750
reported infants and 235 responding obstetricians are
compared. For 1990, 34,005 infants and 260 obstetri-
cians are compared. For 1995, 22,961 infants and 274
obstetrician responses are compared. For 2000, 30,453
infants and 299 obstetricians are compared. The literature
database is more fully elaborated in Table 1. “Expert”
opinions derived from the recollections of practicing obste-
tricians consistently overestimated the actual use of ante-
natal corticosteroids during every year in question: 31% vs
8% for 1985, 56% vs 20% for 1990, 78% vs 52% for
1995, and 92% vs 72% for 2000 (*P  .001). Obstetri-
cians recollections (squares); published data (diamonds)
Meadow. Statistics, Not Memories. Obstet Gynecol 2003.
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Comparisons across and within studies of different size
may be difﬁcult to describe succinctly. How is one to
balance a small study from a single center with a large
study from multiple centers? As an example from the
antenatal corticosteroid analysis, in 1990 14% of 11,077
infants reported from 446 centers in the Exosurf Neona-
tal Treatment Investigational New Drug Program re-
ceived antenatal corticosteroids,
12 compared with 20%
of 480 infants reported from a single center by Teberg et
al.
13 Should we consider the number of studies or the
number of patients within studies? Further, single publi-
cations that report data from multiple centers often de-
scribeawidespectrumofbehavioraroundameanvalue.
As an example, the use of antenatal corticosteroids
among the 30 reporting centers of the Vermont-Oxford
Trials Network in 1990 ranged from 0% to 58%.
18
Finally, inclusion criteria may differ across studies. Con-
sider in the context of antenatal corticosteroids whether
a hypothetic published article included or excluded
mothers with premature rupture of membranes, preg-
nancies above 32 gestational weeks, pregnancies below
26 gestational weeks, or twins. Each of these conditions
has, at times, been argued to be a contraindication for
administration of antenatal corticosteroids.
9–11
There are two related questions here, one narrow and
one broad. Narrowly, how can we deal with published
data in the context of the standard of care for antenatal
corticosteroids? More generally, given the recognition
that published studies will always have overlapping but
nonidentical inclusion criteria and that they will inevita-
bly invoke an interval of uncertainty around every point
estimate, how can statistical analysis ever determine the
standard of care for a single case?
In the speciﬁc instance of antenatal corticosteroids,
one might proceed as follows: Our survey was deliber-
ately designed to ask obstetricians about behavior in a
single “idealized” case, analogous to the opinion an
expert witness would be asked to provide in a single case
of alleged negligence. Published data are, inevitably,
more messy. Even when antenatal corticosteroid use is
intended in all cases, we must assume there will be some
“slippage,” such as mothers who for one reason or
another did not receive antenatal corticosteroids even
though the doctors intended them to do so. Conse-
quently, the actual use of antenatal corticosteroids will
always be a bit lower than the intended use. How can we
accountforthisslippageinourdata-basedformulationof
standard medical care?
We might start by assuming that by the year 2000
almost all obstetricians wanted to use antenatal cortico-
steroids in idealized cases of women threatening preterm
delivery. We then can look to see how close the obste-
tricians came to that ideal and note that the answer is
“quite close.” In 2000, approximately 75% of 30,000
mothers who delivered VLBW infants received antena-
tal corticosteroids (cf Figure 1 and Table 1). This, then,
can be taken as a “ceiling” against which other compar-
isons can be measured. As an example, in 1990, 20% of
all VLBW infants actually received antenatal corticoste-
roids, compared with a theoretic ceiling of 75% who
might have received antenatal corticosteroids. Conse-
quently, the “adjusted” antenatal corticosteroid use in
idealized circumstances in 1990 was approximately 20 of
75(27%).Evenafteradjustmentforslippage,thisvalueis
signiﬁcantly lower than the 56% that our obstetricians
recalled for antenatal corticosteroid use in 1990. For
every time interval studied, even after adjusting pub-
lished reports of antenatal corticosteroid use to account
for the potential of nonideal cases, “expert recollection”
still signiﬁcantly overestimated adjusted antenatal corti-
costeroid use.
Thereisalargerclaimhere.Meta-analysishasbecome
widely accepted in modern medicine. Indeed, it has
become essential to the growth of evidence-based medi-
cal care in obstetrics and elsewhere. However, meta-
analysis is complicated. One possible response to these
complexities might be to argue that statistical analysis is
just too hard for judges, lawyers, and juries to under-
stand. If this is true, then attempts to import data into the
courtroom are doomed. In such a postmodern legal
world, the scientiﬁc method would be abandoned and
only anecdotal narrative would survive.
There is another response, which we favor. We wel-
come methodological complexities and encourage their
elucidation enthusiastically. With this view, the more
light shone upon the meaning of data and the difﬁculties
of importing it the better, precisely because accuracy is
whatismostimportant.Whateverdifﬁcultiesmightarise
in importing statistical methodology into the courtroom,
these problems pale against the alternative: relying on
the memories of individual experts, where none of the
methodological rigor required for scientiﬁc analysis is
applied, or even acknowledged, and where the recollec-
tions are almost certain to be inaccurate.
Ordinary Practice and the Standard of Medical Care
Is standard medical care always the standard of medical
care? That is, are physicians obliged to administer the
care that is “ordinarily provided in the same or similar
circumstances,”
1 or are physicians obliged to conform to
a more aspirational standard, “the care that should be
provided in such circumstances”? In other words, does
customary practice determine negligence?
There is a dispute about the weight to be given to
ordinary practice in medical negligence cases. In some
360 Meadow et al Statistics, Not Memories OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGYjurisdictions, custom deﬁnes reasonable conduct.
32–40
However, in other jurisdictions, both federal
41 and
state,
42–45 a more aspirational standard is applied (not
what physicians ordinarily do, but what a reasonable
physician should have done), and customary medical
treatmentisnotdecisiveontheexerciseofstandardcare.
In these latter jurisdictions, do statistical compilations of
normative practice become irrelevant to expert testi-
mony regarding the standard of care?
The answer is “No.” Even when ordinary practice is
not controlling, it is always relevant, and when it is
relevant, juries and judges should learn what it actually
is. Moreover, in their attempts to inﬂuence judge and
jury, experts ought to distinguish exhortation from nor-
mative description. As an example, consider expert tes-
timony in the context of an allegation concerning
whether use of antenatal corticosteroids for a woman in
preterm labor in the early 1990s was part of the ordinary
standard of care. One can envision an expert obstetric
witness saying that one should have given antenatal cor-
ticosteroids to this woman or even that he or she would
have given antenatal corticosteroids (although, intrigu-
ingly, our data suggest that even these memories are
ﬂawed). However, under no circumstances could an
expert accurately claim that administration of antenatal
corticosteroids in the early 1990s conformed to ordinary
care in similar circumstances. That point is sufﬁcient for
our purposes here. If legal authorities want to depart
from the standard of ordinary care, they should do so
with an accurate rather than fanciful understanding of
what ordinary care is (cf Meadow
46,47).
There can be no doubt that experts know a great deal
about topics on which ordinary people lack information.
But experts, no less than other people, are subject to
predictable memory biases. As a speciﬁc example, we
have shown that a majority of obstetricians “recalled”
antenatal corticosteroid use to be common in the early
1990s, but the best available data suggest that only a
small minority of obstetricians were actually using ante-
natal corticosteroids during this time.
We offer a simple proposal. In determining the stan-
dard of medical care, the legal system should rely, when-
ever it can and far more than it now does, on statistical
data about doctors’ performance rather than the opin-
ions of experts about doctors’ performance. The fallible
memories of isolated experts would be seen as a kind of
crude second-best, far inferior to the data that they
approximate. Widespread adoption of this view by pro-
fessional physician organizations, supplemented by an-
ticipatory publication of practice distributions for poten-
tially problematic clinical scenarios, would dramatically
increase the sense and rationality of expert testimony in
medical malpractice tort law.
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